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In 1990, the Washington State Legislature enacted
Engrossed Substitute House Bill (E.S.H.B.) 2809, which per-
mits a child abuse victim in certain circumstances to testify via
one-way closed-circuit television at the trial of an accused child
abuser.' The legislature enacted the statute in an attempt to
deter future child abuse by facilitating the prosecution of abus-
ers.2 Child abuse cases, particularly child sexual abuse cases,
are some of the most difficult cases to prosecute, in part
because frequently no witnesses exist except the child victim.
In addition, when child abuse is prosecuted, a child victim may
suffer serious emotional and mental trauma from exposure to
the abuser or from testifying in open court. The statute, how-
ever, raises the problem of how to mitigate the trauma for the
child victim without abridging the constitutional rights of the
defendant.3
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, the defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to a
public trial and an opportunity to confront the accuser.4 In
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1. Engrossed Substitute House Bill 2809, 51st Leg., 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 150
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.150 (Supp. 1990-91)) [hereinafter E.S.H.B. 2809].
2. E.S.H.B. 2809, supra note 1, at § 1.
3. Unlike similar statutes from other states, the Washington statute does not
distinguish between physical abuse and sexual abuse but permits child abuse victims to
testify via closed-circuit television in either type of case. Nevertheless, the
particularized findings of emotional distress necessary for use of this procedure are
more likely to occur in cases of sexual abuse. Therefore, this Comment will focus
primarily on child sexual abuse.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides, in pertinent part, that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial . . . [and the right] to be confronted with the
witnesses against him."
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contrast, "child witnesses, even if they were themselves the
victims, have no constitutional rights to protection during the
investigation of a crime or during the trial, despite the horror
already done and the potential trauma caused by future legal
involvement."5  Consequently, a balance must be struck
between society's interests in justice and the protection of its
child victims and the criminal defendant's constitutional right
to confrontation. The survival of E.S.H.B. 2809 depends upon
the views of the United States Supreme Court and the Wash-
ington Supreme Court regarding the scope of confrontation
rights.
This Comment argues that E.S.H.B. 2809 should be recog-
nized as an exception to the Confrontation Clause by the
Supreme Courts of the United States and Washington. This
argument rests upon the premise that E.S.H.B. 2809 falls
within the boundaries set by previously recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule and by federal and Washington case law.
Indeed, the reliability and trustworthiness of the victim's testi-
mony should not turn on the child's ability to withstand the
additional psychological trauma often induced by in-court testi-
mony.' Rather, the special problems that these children bring
to the courtroom demand compliance with a statute such as
the Washington closed-circuit testimony statute to increase the
requirements of reliability and trustworthiness. Thus, the stat-
ute satisfies the strict constitutional requirements of the Con-
frontation Clause.
This Comment begins with a general outline of the prob-
lem of child abuse and the current protections available to
child witnesses. Part III analyzes the Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation and the various exceptions to the Confronta-
tion Clause. Part IV addresses the Washington State Constitu-
tion and Washington State case law, concluding that the
statute is likely to sustain constitutional challenge. Part V
examines various provisions of the statute and concludes that
E.S.H.B. 2809 satisfies the essential elements of the right to
confrontation and is a viable exception to the Confrontation
5. Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions For Research
and Legal Practice, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 157, 169 (1984).
6. Hearsay statutes permit admissibility of child victims' hearsay statements when
the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness (sometimes referred to as indicia of
reliability) required under the Confrontation Clause are present. Michael H. Graham,
The Confrontation Clause, The Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions:
The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REv. 523, 536 (1988).
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Clause. Part VI specifies the areas in which E.S.H.B. 2809 falls
short of its underlying purpose and proposes the adoption of an
additional statute authorizing the use of videotaped testimony
to provide additional protection for victims of child abuse.
II. DOUBLE VICTIMIZATION: ABUSED BY THE ABUSER AND
THE SYSTEM
A. The Problem of Child Abuse
Abuse of children is an intractable problem of menacing
proportions. Awareness and concern over child abuse, particu-
larly child sexual abuse, has escalated greatly in recent years.7
Increased frequency of child sexual abuse,' along with
increased awareness of the extensiveness of the psychological
scarring this type of abuse causes,9 has contributed to public
outcry on the subject.10 Nevertheless, once child sexual abuse
is reported, legal barriers often block the successful prosecu-
tion of these cases.'"
The low conviction rate of child sexual abusers has been
attributed to several causes.'2 First, because child sexual abuse
is rarely witnessed by anyone other than the victim, it is often
difficult to prove. Consequently, many offenders who are
arrested plea bargain to lesser charges and are often released
7. National data published by the American Humane stated that 2.2 million child
abuse and neglect reports were filed in 1987 (40 to 45% were confirmed). In the State
of Washington, 1986 data shows that more than 43,000 incidents of abuse or neglect
were reported to Children's Protective Services. WASHINGTON COUNCIL FOR
PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, REPORT No. 88-5 (1989). Another study
estimates that each year, over 750,000 children between ages 3 and 17 are severely
abused by their parents. Richard J. Gelles & Murray A. Straus, Is Violence Toward
Children Increasing?, 2 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 212, 217-18 (1987). In a six-
month period during 1988, 1,701 cases of physical abuse against children and 2,485
sexual assaults against children were reported to law enforcement in the state of
Washington. GOVERNOR'S JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., WASHINGTON ASS'N OF
SHERIFFS & POLICE CHIEFS, & OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMES AGAINST
CHILDREN: SPECIAL CHILD ABUSE REPORT (1988).
8. See SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, ABUSED CHILDREN IN
AMERICA: VICTIMS OF OFFICIAL NEGLECT, H.R. Rep. No. 260, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
9. ROBERT L. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTIMS: THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 27, 29
(1979) (stating that victims of child sexual abuse often suffer from a time-bomb effect
of emotional and psychological harm).
10. David Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the
Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 980-81 (1969).
11. Sol Gothard, The Admissibility of Evidence In Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 66
CHILD WELFARE 13, 13-14 (1987).
12. Lucy Berliner & Mary Kay Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of
Sexual Assault, 40(2) J. Soc. ISSUES 125, 127 (1984).
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and repeat the offenses.13 Second, many people within the
criminal justice system believe that sexual abusers have
mental disorders and therefore should be treated by the
mental health system. 4 Third, many parents fear that the
pursuit of these cases would further traumatize the child.
Hence, parents frequently elect not to prosecute in order to
spare the child the emotional trauma of repeated interviews
and of testifying in court.'5 Finally, prosecutors are often reluc-
tant to undertake sexual abuse cases that rest primarily on the
testimony of child victims. 6 One problem frequently cited by
prosecutors is that the child freezes when asked to testify in
front of the defendant.'
7
Despite the low conviction rate of child sexual abusers,
children are increasingly called upon to testify in open court as
a result of greater incidences of reported abuse among chil-
dren. Frequently, no witnesses exist except the child victim.'"
Therefore, as traumatic as the experience may be, the child
must testify or prosecution will likely be halted.
When a child victim of sexual assault testifies at trial, he
or she may suffer serious emotional or psychological harm. 9
Many researchers believe that requiring a child, who may
13. Gothard, supra note 11, at 13-14.
14. Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 12, at 127.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1333 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); see
also Catherine M. Mahady-Smith, Comment, The Young Victim as Witness for the
Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV. 721, 730-35 (1985). See
generally DEBRA WHITCOMB, ET AL., WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES
AND PROSECUTORS (1985) (addressing issues involving child victim-witnesses and
recommending reforms).
18. Maira H. Bainor, Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of Two-Way Closed
Circuit Television to Take the Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 995, 1000 (1985).
19. Gary B. Melton, Psycholegal Issues in Child Victims' Interaction With the
Legal System, 5 VICrIMOLOGy 274, 275 (1980). Melton cites Burgess and Holstrom,
authors of studies at Boston City Hospital in 1978, who noted four common
psychological responses to the legal process by child victims and their families. First,
time is suspended. Given the delays that are often experienced within the process, the
family may find itself preoccupied with the assault and the ensuing legal process, and
they may have difficulty returning to normal activities. Second, the legal process
requires the psychological recapitulation of the assault. The child must repeatedly tell
authorities about the assault he or she experienced and do so in great detail. If the
case goes to trial, the child will most likely face the alleged offender. Furthermore,
the child must do so in an atmosphere and a setting that will probably be fear-
producing and confusing. Third, victims become aware that people are skeptical about
their story and fear violent suspicion. And fourth, the child and family may feel
betrayed by people previously considered supportive.
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already be traumatized by the attack, to face the defendant in
the courtroom is a major cause of such emotional harm.2" In
fact, some investigators believe that the child is traumatized
more by the defendant's presence in the courtroom and the
formality of the situation than by the actual assault.2 ' Others
believe that the process of bringing the abuser to justice can be
a healthy part of the child's recovery.22
In State v. Sheppard,2" the Superior Court of New Jersey
recognized the potential trauma to children when it noted:
An adult witness, testifying in court, surrounded by the
usual court atmosphere, aware of the black-robed judge, a
jury, attorneys, members of the public, uniformed attend-
ants, a flag, and religious overtones, is more likely to testify
truthfully. The opposite is true of a child, particularly when
the setting involves a relative accused by her of sexual
abuse. She becomes fearful, guilty, anxious, and trauma-
tized. In most cases, she will have been exposed to both
pleasant and abusive associations with the accused. As a
consequence, she has ambivalent feelings.... These mixed
feelings, accompanied by the fear, guilt and anxiety, mitigate
the truth, producing inaccurate testimony. 4
20. See Colly J. Frissell-Durley, Comment, Abandoning Trial by Ordeal:
Missouri's New Videotaping Statute, 51 Mo. L. REV. 515 (1986). Note, The Testimony
of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 806, 807 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Two Legislative Innovations] (stating that
children sometimes recant to absolve a relative or family friend).
21. See Frissell-Durley, supra note 20, at 516 n.5. See generally Carol Marks, Note,
Victimizing the Child Victim: Vermont Rule of Evidence 807 and the Trauma in the
Courtroom, 11 VT. L. REV. 631, 646-47 (1986) (stating that testifying in court is thought
to be more traumatic for the child than the assault itself because of the repeated
interrogations, cross-examination, confrontation, formality of the courtroom,
possibility that the defendant may be acquitted, hearing the defendant's version of the
events, and the length of the trial); Bainor, supra note 18, at 997 n.6 ("recounting the
events and details of the crime may be as damaging to the child victim of a sex offense
as the crime itself"). Fear and reluctance to testify may result from the child's
recollection of the authority and superior physical strength the perpetrator had during
the attack and continues to have over the child. See Berlinger & Barbieri, supra note
12, at 126 (noting that larger, stronger, more sophisticated offenders can control and
abuse children by threatening or pressuring the child to remain silent). An attacker is
frequently in a position of authority or responsibility over the child. Id. These factors
frequently make the child both powerless to prevent the attack and fearful of
reporting it, even to a parent. Id. at 128. If the abuser is someone close to the child,
the child is often badly torn between loyalty to the abuser and the desire to escape the
situation.
22. Carl M. Rogers, Child Sexual Abuse and the Courts: Preliminary Findings, J.
Soc. WORK & CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 145, 145-47 (1982).
23. 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
24. Id. at 1332.
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In addition to problems with inaccurate testimony, numer-
ous other problems face child victims who testify in court. The
child must reveal the intimate details of the attack.2" The
child may be obligated to make repeated court appearances.
And once in court, the child will eventually be confronted by
the accused. The problems of the judicial process are often
compounded by deeper psychological problems. In cases of
known abusers, "[ilt is likely that the child is already psycho-
logically disturbed as a result of emotional deprivation in a dis-
turbed home, the trauma of sexual molestation, and guilt about
his or her own part in the offense.
26
The realities of giving courtroom testimony often result in
parents' unwillingness to allow children to testify.27  Thus,
while reported cases are on the increase, relatively few result
in convictions.2 This leaves many child abusers on the streets
and not receiving help. More importantly, children continue to
be sexually assaulted and thus are not being as well protected
as they could be with judicial intervention. Legal commenta-
tors, and those who work closely with abused children, advo-
cate changes in the legal treatment of child abuse victims to
spare them further psychological damage caused by the crimi-
nal trial process and its emphasis on the defendant's rights.'
25. See Marks, supra note 21, at 647.
26. Barry Nurcombe, The Child As Witness: Competency and Credibility, 25 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 473, 475 (1986).
27. Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 12, at 128. (noting that parents may be
reluctant to report the crime or follow up its prosecution for fear of further injuring
either the child or the perpetrator who is a family member).
28. See State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984), where
the court's review of the state's case-in-chief testimony reveals:
In most cases, prosecutions are abandoned or result in generous plea
agreements, either because the child's emotional condition prevents her from
testifying or makes the testimony obviously inaccurate or inadequate. One
attorney, who had handled 30 to 40 of these cases for the State, was able to
complete a trial in only one. In most, while the child victim was able to
provide her with information sufficient to support a prosecution and was
sometimes able to appear with difficulty before a grand jury, she could not
testify in court face-to-face with the accused and other relatives.
Id. at 1333.
29. BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH & CHARLES B. SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL: AMERICA'S
COURTS AND THEIR TREATMENT OF SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN 169 (1989); Lucy
Berliner, Counseling and Follow-up Interaction for the Sexually Abused Child, in
MANAGEMENT OF THE PHYSICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY ABUSED 281, 284 (Carmen G.
Warner & G. Richard Braen eds. 1982); Richard N.W. Lambert, Victims Have Rights
Too, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 449, 455; Jacqueline Y. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses:
Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643 (1981-82); see also
Libai, supra note 10.
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B. Current Protections Available to Child Witnesses
Children stand in need of certain protections and privi-
leges when the legal system requires that they participate by
taking the stand and offering their testimony. Protections
designed to shield child victims from the trauma of exposure to
the abuser and the courtroom will facilitate prosecution of
child abusers.
In response to the problem of courtroom trauma, many
states have enacted legislation that attempts to minimize the
psychological trauma child victims undergo in the court system
while increasing the effectiveness of prosecuting child abusers.
At present, thirty-one states have enacted laws providing for
closed-circuit television testimony of child witnesses in lieu of
testimony in the courtroom, 30 thirty-eight states have enacted
statutes that permit the introduction of videotaped testimony,31
30. Provisions allowing for one-way closed-circuit television: ALA. CODE § 15-25-3
(Supp. 1989); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
4253(A) (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (1989); FLA. STAT. ch. 92.54 (1989); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-8-55 (Harrison Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 106A-3 (Smith-Hurd
1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14(I)
(West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3)
(Baldwin Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1989); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1989); MICH. CoMP LAWS § 600.2163a (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02
(West 1988); MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4
(West Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753(B) (West Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5985 (Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.071, § 3 (West Supp. 1989); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-
15.5(2) (Supp. 1989).
Provisions allowing for use of two-way closed-circuit television: CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1347 (West Supp. 1989); HAW. R. EVID. 616; IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A (Supp. 1989);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (4) (West 1988); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.10 (McKinney
Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(c) (Anderson 1987); VT. R. EVID. § 807(e)
(Supp. 1989); and VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:1 (Michie 1991).
31. Provisions allowing for use of videotaped depositions and prior testimony of
child abuse victims: ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1989); ARIM. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
4252 to -4253(B) (Supp. 1988); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1989); HAW. R. EVID. 616; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
106A-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8-(d) (Burns Supp. 1991);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14(2) (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1557 (1986);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Baldwin Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
278, § 16D(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163a(13) (West
Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407
(Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.680 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-
15-401 to -403 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1925 to -1926 (Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 174.227 (Michie 986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-17 (Michie Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A) (Anderson
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and twenty states have enacted special hearsay exceptions for
statements made by children.s2 Generally, the objective of
such statutes is to remove the inhibiting aspects of courtroom
testimony, thus permitting the child to speak more freely and
with less fear in relating the details of the ordeal."3
Washington is one such state that has recognized child
abuse as an urgent problem. Washington was the first of sev-
eral states to enact a child sexual abuse hearsay exception. 4
The child hearsay exception permits the admission of an out-
of-court statement about sexual abuse made by a child under
the age of ten. Such statements, however, are only admitted if
the court finds that the statement contains sufficient indicia of
reliability and that, if the child is unavailable, evidence of the
criminal act is corroborated.35
1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753(C) (West Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5984 (Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
1530(G) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANlN. § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1989); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 4 (West
Supp. 1989); VT. R. EVID. 807(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:3 (Michie Supp. 1989);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989); and WYo. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987).
32. Provisions allowing for admission of child victim hearsay statements: ALASKA
STAT. § 12.40.110 (1990); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-
1001 (Michie 1987); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
25-129 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024
(1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, $ 115-10 (Smith-Hurd 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6
(Burns Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1991); MINN STAT. § 260.156, 595.02(3) (Supp. 1992); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-403 (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (Vernon 1992); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West Supp. 1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5986 (1991);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987); TExAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072
(West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1990); and WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1990-91).
33. See Marks, supra note 21, at 808.
34. See WASH REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1990-91); see also WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9A.64.020, 9A.04.080 (Supp. 1990-91) (amended in 1982 to expand statutory definition
of incest and to extend the statute of limitations for child sexual abuse prosecutions,
see Act of Apr. 1, 1982, ch. 129, § 1, 3, 1982 Wash Laws 559-60).
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1987) provides:
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of
sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise
admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in dependency
proceedings under Title 13 RCW and criminal proceedings in the courts of the
state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury,
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, That when the child is unavailable
as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative
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Nevertheless, the current child hearsay exception only
allows for the admission of past, out-of-court statements if the
child is unavailable and, thus, may deprive defendants of any
chance to cross-examine their accuser. Therefore, during the
1990 session, the Washington State Legislature enacted
E.S.H.B. 2809 that allows closed-circuit transmission of testi-
mony of child witnesses by adding a new section to chapter
9A.44 of the Revised Code of Washington.36 This new section
permits child abuse victims to testify via one-way closed-circuit
television at the trial court's discretion. 7 In addition to pro-
tecting child victims from the trauma of exposure to the
evidence of the act. A statement may not be admitted under this section
unless the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement
sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
36. E.S.H.B. 2809, supra note 1.
37. E.S.H.B. 2809 provides in pertinent part:
On motion of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal proceeding, the court may
order that a child under the age of ten may testify in a room outside the presence of
the defendant and the jury while one-way closed-circuit television equipment
simultaneously projects the child's testimony into another room so the defendant and
the jury can watch and hear the child testify if:
(a) The testimony will describe an act or attempted act of sexual contact
performed with or on the child by another or describe an act or attempted act
of physical abuse against the child by another;
(b) The testimony is taken during the criminal proceeding;
(c) The court finds by substantial evidence, in a hearing conducted outside the
presence of the jury, that requiring the child to testify in the presence of the
defendant will cause the child to suffer serious emotional or mental distress
that will prevent the child from reasonably communicating at the trial. If the
defendant is excluded from the presence of the child, the jury must also be
excluded;
(d) As provided in subsection (1) (a) and (b) of this section, the court may
allow a child to testify in the presence of the defendant but outside the
presence of the jury, via closed-circuit television, if the court finds, upon
motion and hearing outside the presence of the jury, that the child will suffer
serious emotional distress that will prevent the child from reasonably
communicating at the trial in front of the jury, or, that although the child
may be able to reasonably communicate at trial in front of the jury, the child
will suffer serious emotional or mental distress from testifying in front of the
jury. If the child is able to communicate in front of the defendant but not the
jury, the defendant will remain in the room with the child while the jury is
excluded from the room;
(e) The court finds that the prosecutor has made all reasonable efforts to
prepare the child for testifying, including informing the child or the child's
parent or guardian about community counseling services, giving court tours,
and explaining the trial process. If the prosecutor fails to demonstrate that
preparations were implemented or the prosecutor in good faith attempted to
implement them, the court shall deny the motion;
(f) The court balances the strength of the state's case without the testimony
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abuser and the courtroom, this procedural device is designed to
enhance the truth seeking process.38 Although the primary
purpose of the new provision is to protect children, the pri-
mary issue raised is whether the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights are violated by the provision.
III. THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... ,, Confrontation generally requires that the
witnesses be present at trial and that the defendant be allowed
to cross-examine each witness.40 Confrontation is a fundamen-
of the child against the defendant's constitutional rights and the degree of
infringement of the closed-circuit television procedure on those rights;
(g) The court finds that no less restrictive method of obtaining the testimony
exists that can adequately protect the child from the serious emotional or
mental distress;
(h) When the court allows the child to testify outside the presence of the
defendant, the defendant can communicate constantly with the defense
attorney by electronic transmission and be granted reasonable court recesses
during the child's testimony for person-to-person consultation with the
defense attorney;
(i) The court can communicate with the attorneys by an audio system so that
the court can rule on objections and otherwise control the proceedings;
(j) All parties in the room with the child are on camera and can be viewed by
all other parties. If viewing all participants is not possible, the court shall
describe for the viewers the location of the prosecutor, defense attorney, and
other participants in relation to the child;
(k) The court finds that the television equipment is capable of making an
accurate reproduction of and the operator of the equipment is competent to
operate the equipment; and
(1) The court imposes reasonable guidelines upon the parties for conducting
the filming to avoid trauma to the child or abuse of the procedure for tactical
advantage.
The prosecutor, defense attorney, and a neutral and trained victim's advocate,
if any, shall always be in the room where the child is testifying. The court in
the court's discretion depending on the circumstances and whether the jury or
defendant or both are excluded from the room where the child is testifying,
may remain or may not remain in the room with the child.
E.S.H.B. 2809, supra note 1, at § 2.
38. Id. at § 1.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965) (reversing conviction because
State introduced the transcript of a witness's testimony given at the preliminary
hearing at which the defendant was not represented by counsel and had no
opportunity to cross-examine); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (petitioner's
inability to cross-examine the alleged accomplice denied petitioner the right of cross-
examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment).
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tal right essential to a fair trial.4 The right to confront
adverse witnesses is applied to the states through the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
The Confrontation Clause reflects a belief that face-to-face
confrontation at trial enhances the truth-seeking process. In
California v. Green,48 the United States Supreme Court set
forth three purposes behind the right to confrontation: to
ensure that the witness will give his or her statements under
oath; to force the witness to submit to cross-examination; and
to permit the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness,
thereby helping the jury assess his or her credibility."
In assessing the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has concluded that a defendant's
right to confront his accuser is not absolute.45 In Mattox v.
United States,46 for example, the Court stated that general con-
stitutional provisions "must occasionally give way to considera-
tion of public policy and the necessities of the case."47
Accordingly, rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause are
not absolute and may give way to other important interests.48
Because the rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause
are not absolutely guaranteed, the Supreme Court has pro-
nounced a number of exceptions to the clause that are concur-
rent exceptions to the hearsay rule. The exceptions
demonstrate the flexibility of the Confrontation Clause.
Rather than interpreting the clause literally and rigidly, the
Court permits these exceptions to "further the Confrontation
Clause's very mission which is to 'advance the "accuracy of the
truth determining process in criminal trials." ' ".49
41. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (stating that the right to
confrontation is "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty" and "a right
long deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded
against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution of the United
States and in the constitutions of most if not all the States composing the Union.")
42. Id at 403. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
43. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
44. Id. at 175 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
46. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
47. Id. at 243.
48. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016.
49. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986) (quoting Tennessee v. Street,
471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970))).
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A. Exceptions to the Right to Confrontation
Cases interpreting the Confrontation Clause tend to fall
into two general categories: those involving the admission of
hearsay statements and those involving limitations on cross-
examination. 5° The Supreme Court has developed a number of
exceptions in assessing the purpose of the clause in both types
of cases.
An early exception to the right of confrontation was recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States.5" In
Mattox, the Court noted that dying declarations traditionally
have been admitted into evidence as an exception to the Con-
frontation Clause even though such statements often are made
out of the presence of the accused and the jury and are made
without benefit of cross-examination. 2 The Court found that
the admission of dying declarations into evidence is necessary
because of the declarant's subsequent demise and, therefore, is
required "to prevent a manifest failure of justice.
' 53
Two additional exceptions to the Confrontation Clause
were recognized by the Supreme Court in California v.
Green.' In Green, an available declarant's prior inconsistent
statements were introduced at trial.' At trial, the witness
recanted his prior statement, claiming a lapse of memory when
confronted with the preliminary hearing transcript.' To
refresh the witness's recollection, the prosecution introduced
the preliminary hearing testimony, which the trial judge
admitted.57 The Supreme Court held that the admission did
not violate the defendant's right to confrontation.5 s
In so holding, the Court found that "the Confrontation
Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court
statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness
and is subject to full and effective cross-examination."59 The
Court also held that a declarant's preliminary hearing state-
ments are admissible at trial even if the declarant is unavaila-
50. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985).
51. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
52. Id. at 243-44.
53. Id. at 244.
54. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
55. Id. at 151.
56. Id. at 151-52.
57. Id. at 152.
58. Id. at 164-65.
59. Id. at 158.
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ble to testify when the "statement at the preliminary hearing
. . . [was] given under circumstances closely approximating
those that surround the typical trial. '60 Accordingly, a declar-
ant's preliminary hearing statements are admissible at the
later trial if the declarant is an unavailable witness and if at
the preliminary hearing: (1) the declarant was under oath; (2)
the defendant was represented by counsel; (3) the defendant
had every opportunity to cross-examine the declarant; and (4)
the hearing took place before a judge and was recorded.6 '
Thus, the Court permitted the introduction of the declarant's
statements even though the defendant was unable to actually
"confront" the declarant when the statements against him
were made.
Drawing upon the above exceptions, the Supreme Court
once again addressed the Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Rob-
errs.6 In Roberts, a hearsay declarant, present at the defend-
ant's preliminary hearing, was unavailable to testify at trial.6 3
The Court upheld the admission of the statements into evi-
dence, finding that the prosecution had satisfied both the
necessity and reliability requirements necessary for a Confron-
tation Clause exception." In so holding, the Court established
a two-prong test to determine whether statements made at
preliminary hearings would be allowed into evidence in excep-
tion to the Confrontation Clause.65 Specifically, this test set
out the two essential components of Confrontation Clause
exceptions: "unavailability"' and "indicia of reliability. 61 7
As to the unavailability requirement, the Roberts Court
held that the prosecution may circumvent the Confrontation
Clause's "preference for face-to-face accusation"' if it demon-
strates that the out-of-court statement is the sole source of the
information and that the declarant is unavailable for trial. 9
Applying this principle to the facts in Roberts, the Court found
that the prosecution had attempted to locate the declarant
60. Id. at 165.
61. Id.
62. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
63. Id. at 58.
64. Id. at 74-75.
65. Id. at 67-77.
66. Id. at 65.
67. Id. at 65-66 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1972)).
68. Id. at 65.
69. Id. at 74-75.
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before trial but without success.70 In this way, the prosecution
had met the unavailability requirement.7 '
After demonstrating that the declarant is unavailable, the
prosecution must then show that the out-of-court statement
bears adequate indicia of reliability.7 2 Reliability may be
inferred either when "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception,"7 3 or when the evidence contains a "particu-
larized guarantee of trustworthiness."7 4 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Blackmun noted that because the defendant's
counsel cross-examined the witness at the preliminary hearing
as a matter of "form ' 75 and "purpose,"7 6 the defendant was
afforded the requisite protection envisioned under the Con-
frontation Clause. 7 In fact, the Court in Roberts found that
"the opportunity to cross-examine.., even absent actual cross-
examination... satisfies the Confrontation Clause.
78
The Supreme Court provided further guidance on permis-
sible limitations on the right to confrontation in Delaware v.
Fensterer.7 9 The Court held that "the Confrontation Clause
guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish." 0 In Fensterer, the
state's expert witness testified that, in his opinion, a hair found
on the alleged murder weapon had been forcibly removed from
the victim."' But on direct and cross-examination, the expert
could not recall which of three methods had been employed to
70. Id. at 75-77. Five subpoenas for four different trial dates were issued to the
out-of-court declarant at her parents' residence. She was not at the residence when
these were executed and no one, including her parents, knew her whereabouts. Id.
71. Id. at 77.
72. Id. at 65-66.
73. Id. at 66. The rule against hearsay is riddled with exceptions developed over
three centuries. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 244 (2d ed. 1972)
(discussing the history of the hearsay rule); id. at 252-324 (discussing exceptions to the
hearsay rule). See also, FED. R. EvID. 803, 804 (expressly codifying over 20 specified
exceptions to the hearsay rule).
74. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. A statement contains a particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness if the trier of fact is afforded "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the
truth of the prior statement." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
75. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71.
76. Id. at 71.
77. Id. at 73.
78. Id. at 70 (emphasis in original). See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S. at 166.
79. 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
80. Id. at 20 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 16.
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determine whether the hair had been forcibly removed. 2 The
Court held that the admission of the expert's testimony did not
violate the Confrontation Clause. 8 In so doing, the Court
stated that although cross-examination effectuates the defend-
ant's purpose, the defendant's right to confrontation was not
offended because the defendant was able to probe and expose
the weaknesses in the expert's testimony through cross-
examination.'
The many accepted exceptions to the Confrontation
Clause illustrate that the Supreme Court has "never embraced
the view that the right to confrontation unconditionally man-
dates that all witnesses" must testify in the presence of the
accused and confront him or her face-to-face.8 5 To the con-
trary, the Supreme Court has said that "a technical adherence
to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be
carried farther than is necessary to the just protection of the
accused, and farther than the safety of the public will
warrant.
86
B. Furtherance of an Important Public Policy
Although the Court fashions concrete rules upon which to
graft exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, public policy con-
siderations also underlie Confrontation Clause exceptions, 7
which are allowed when necessary to further an important
public policy. For example, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Court,8 the Supreme Court recognized safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor as "compel-
ling" policy.89 The State argued that a statute excluding the
general public from sexual offense trials involving children
82. Id. at 17.
83. Id at 22.
84. Id.
85. Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 531 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 594
A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991) (reversed on state constitutional grounds).
86. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). See also Mancusi v. Stubbs,
408 U.S. 204 (1972).
87. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240.
88. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
89. Id. The Court granted certiorari to determine whether a Massachusetts
statute that excluded the public from sexual offense trials involving children violated
the First Amendment. Id. at 599. The majority applied a strict scrutiny standard of
review and held that, in order to justify the exclusion of the public from criminal
trials, the state must show that the closure of the courtroom is necessitated by a
"compelling governmental interest" and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id.
at 607.
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would protect minor victims from further trauma or embar-
rassment and encourage victims to come forward and testify in
a truthful and credible manner.' The Supreme Court agreed
with the State:
[T]he first interest-safeguarding the physical and psycho-
logical well-being of a minor-is a compelling one. But as
compelling as that interest is, it does not justify a mandatory
closure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances of the par-
ticular case may affect the significance of the interest. A
trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether
closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor
victim.9 1
Although the Court went on to hold the Massachusetts statute
unconstitutional because it was not sufficiently tailored to
account for the facts of each individual case, the "compelling
interest" analysis provides a framework in which statutes
designed to protect child abuse witnesses can be examined.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's express averment that
protection of children is a "compelling interest" fits directly
into that framework. In New York v. Ferber,92 a bookstore
owner sold films depicting sexual acts involving young boys.93
The bookstore owner was subsequently convicted under a New
York statute for knowingly promoting a sexual performance
by a child.94 In upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court
noted that a state has an interest in safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of minors.95 The Court in Ferber
emphasized that the prevention of sexual abuse of children is a
governmental interest of surpassing importance and conse-
quently, the balance of competing interests is struck in favor of
the child.96 Thus, Globe and Ferber suggest that the Supreme
90. Id.
91. Id. at 607-08 (emphasis in original).
92. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
93. Id. at 751-52.
94. Id. at 752.
95. Id. at 756-57. Writing for the majority, Justice White stated:
It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a state's interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor" is
"compelling." "A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens."
Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical
and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the
sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights.
Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 757.
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Court is willing to abridge constitutionally protected rights in
order to protect the welfare of children in certain situations.
C. Face-to-Face Confrontation
The crux of any defense argument in cases involving laws
protecting child witnesses is that the defendant has a right to
view his or her accuser face-to-face.
In Coy v. Iowa,97 the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-
face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact."9 However, the Court expressly left for another day "the
question whether any exceptions exist. Whatever they may be,
they would surely be allowed only when necessary to furnish
an important public policy."'
The procedure challenged in Coy was the placement of a
screen between the defendant and the child witness."° At
trial, the State moved, pursuant to Iowa Code section 910A.14,
to allow one of the alleged victims to testify against the defend-
ant behind the large screen in the courtroom. 10 1 The screen
allowed the defendant to see the child witnesses, but the child
witnesses could not see the defendant.102 The defendant
argued that the use of the screen violated his confrontation
rights; the trial court rejected the argument.10 3 The defendant
appealed his conviction to the Iowa Supreme Court, and that
court affirmed the conviction. 0 4
On further appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court decision.'05 The Court held that use of the screen at trial
violated the defendant's right to confront witnesses against
him."° In disallowing this procedure, the majority emphasized
that something more than a generalized finding of trauma in
the statute is needed when the Confrontation Clause exception
is not "firmly . . .rooted in our jurisprudence.' 1 7 The Court
97. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
98. Id. at 1016.
99. Id. at 1021.
100. Id. at 1014.
101. Id. at 1014-15.
102. Id.
103. Id at 1015.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1022.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1021 (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987), citing
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)).
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concluded that because there had been "no individualized find-
ings that these particular witnesses need special protection,"
the procedure could not be upheld.' In so holding, the Court
hinted that a child abuse testimony exception to the Confron-
tation Clause might be possible if the exception was based on
individualized findings.'0°
Justice O'Connor rejected the majority's suggestion that a
defendant's right to physically face those that testify against
him or her is absolute."0 In concurrence, Justice O'Connor
specifically stated her belief that the confrontation right "may
give way in an appropriate case to other competing interests so
as to permit the use of certain procedural devices designed to
shield a child witness from the trauma of courtroom testi-
mony.""' Justice O'Connor recognized that one-half of the
states permit the use of one- or two-way closed-circuit televi-
sion in child abuse cases." 2 Noting the high incidence of child
abuse in our society and, in particular, the problems of prose-
cution of child abuse cases, Justice O'Connor explicitly stated
that "nothing in today's decision necessarily dooms such efforts
by state legislatures to protect child witnesses." ''"
Thus, Justice O'Connor clearly stated that the protection
of child witnesses is an important public policy that calls for
something other than face-to-face confrontation. Justice
O'Connor may have seen this protection as the important pub-
lic policy warranting a possible Confrontation Clause excep-
tion, which the majority left for "another day."' 4 The Court's
suggestion is that, in order for the strictures of the Confronta-
tion Clause to give way, a court must make a case-specific find-
ing of need to utilize an alternative method of presenting
testimony." 5 Interestingly, although the majority opinion
made reference to the dissent, it made no effort to dispute Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring position. 6
The Supreme Court decided the question of exceptions to
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1024 (O'Connor, White, JJ., concurring).
111. Id. at 1022.
112. Id. at 1023.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1021.
115. Id. The Court concluded that "[slince there have been no individualized
findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection, the judgment here
could not be sustained by any conceivable exception." Id.
116. Id. at 1018-19 & n.2.
[Vol. 15:913
1992] Closed-Circuit Testimony 931
face-to-face confrontation reserved in Coy when it examined
such confrontation in Maryland v. Craig."7  In Craig v.
State, 18 the defendant, who owned and operated a preschool,
was charged with sexually abusing several of her students." 9
At trial, the State moved to have the child witnesses testify via
one-way closed-circuit television pursuant to section 9-102 of
the Maryland Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. 20 The
trial judge granted the motion, and the children testified by
closed-circuit television.' 21  Craig subsequently was
convicted.
122
On appeal to the Maryland Special Court of Appeals, Craig
contended that section 9-102 was unconstitutional in light of
the Supreme Court decision in Coy.' 23 Nevertheless, the Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction. 24  The appeals
court held that the trial judge's particularized finding of the
children's psychological unavailability satisfied the require-
ments of Coy.' 25  Moreover, the court found that section 9-102
did indeed "further an important public policy.'
' 26
Craig appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the court
agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that section 9-102 is
constitutional. 27 However, the court held that exceptions to
117. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
118. 544 A.2d 784 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'd, 560 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1989),
vacated sub nom., 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
119. Craig v. State, 544 A.2d at 786.
120. Id. at 787. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989). Section 9-
102 provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) In case of abuse of a child... a court may order that the testimony of a
child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtoom by
means of closed-circuit television if: (i) The testimony is taken during the
proceeding; and (ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim
in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
121. Craig v. State, 544 A.2d at 787.
122. Id. Craig was convicted on counts of child abuse, first and second degree
sexual offenses, unnatural and perverted sexual practice, assault, and battery. Id. at
786.
123. See id. at 796.
124. Id. at 807.
125. Id. at 800-02.
126. Id. at 800. According to the Court of Special Appeals, that policy is two-fold:
(1) to protect children generally from traumatic events, and (2) to further the truth-
finding process. If a child by testifying in court is so traumatized as to be unable to
communicate, "the truth of the matter might never be revealed.... and a dangerous
person might be turned loose to continue his or her predation, perhaps ... upon the
same helpless victim."
127. State v. Craig, 560 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Md. 1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
The court found that for Sixth Amendment and state constitution confrontation
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the Confrontation Clause, including section 9-102, may only be
invoked in the narrowest of circumstances. 128 In reversing
Craig's conviction, the Court of Appeals held that the State did
not meet the "high threshold required ... before section 9-102
may be invoked.' 1 29  In response, the state of Maryland
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.13 0
The Supreme Court rejected Craig's contention that the
use of one-way closed-circuit testimony violated the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment and held that one-way
closed-circuit television can be used in child abuse cases when
a case-specific showing of necessity is made. l3 ' Nevertheless,
the Court acknowledged in Craig that Coy affirmed physical,
face-to-face confrontation as an important aspect of confronta-
tion'3 2 with historic roots in criminal jurisprudence. 133
Although the Court recognized that face-to-face meeting
forms "the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause, . . . it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation
right."' 34 In fact, the Court noted many instances of recog-
nized exceptions to actual face-to-face encounters at trial
where testimony can be admitted against a defendant. 35 The
purposes, the defendant can be denied the right to "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation
where necessary to obtain the trial testimony of the child. Id. at 1127.
128. Id. at 1125. The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge must first see the
child testifying in the defendant's presence. Id. at 1127. The child must show signs of
so much emotional distress that he or she is unable to testify before the one-way
closed-circuit television can be used. Id.
129. Id. at 1121. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be remanded for a new
trial. Id. at 1129.
130. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3162 (1990). The Court granted certiorari
to resolve the Confrontation Clause issues raised by the case. Id.
131. Id. at 3170.
132. Id. at 3162 (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 748-50 (1987)). The Court
noted that the central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability
of evidence by subjecting it to rigorous testing before the trier of fact. Id. at 3163. This
testing is accomplished through the elements of physical presence, oath, cross-
examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact. Id.
133. Id. at 3162 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (the
primary objective of the constitutional provision for confrontation is to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits from being used against the accused instead of in-
court testimony with an opportunity for cross-examination) (also citing California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970)).
134. Id. at 3164 (citation omitted).
135. The right of confrontation can be waived when the defendant engages in
disruptive behavior in the courtroom. Id. at 3166 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
342-43 (1970) (stating that trial judge must use the clear and convincing standard of
proof in determining whether defendant has by his conduct waived his constitutional
right to confrontation)). The right to confrontation has been restricted by limits on
the availability of cross-examination, id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,
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Court then concluded that although there is a preference for
face-to-face confrontation at trial, such a preference "must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case.1
13 6
The Court went on to acknowledge its suggestion in Coy
that "a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may
be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial
only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further
an important public policy and only where reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured.' 3 s7  The Court viewed the
Maryland statute and the procedure employed by the trial
court as preserving all aspects of confrontation: the witness
testified under oath; a full opportunity was provided for the
defendant to cross-examine the witness; and the witness's
demeanor was observed by the judge and the jury in the court-
room and by the defendant on a television monitor.138 The
Court stated that the presence of these elements ensures that
"the testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adver-
sarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that
accorded live, in-person testimony." '139 The Court also noted
that the procedure is "a far cry from the undisputed prohibi-
tion of the Confrontation Clause: trial by ex parte affidavit or
inquisition."'4 Thus, the Court concluded that the Maryland
procedure was reliable.
After examining the Confrontation Clause protections
present in the Maryland procedure, the Court weighed the
State's interest in promulgating the statute. The Court con-
cluded that "a State's interest in the physical and psychological
51-52 (1987) (holding that denial of access to the files of a protective service agency did
not violate the Confrontation Clause)), the scope of cross-examination, id. at 3164
(citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (holding that the Confrontation
Clause is satisfied by an opportunity to cross-examine even when frustrated by the
lapse of memory of a prosecution expert witness)), and hearsay exceptions, id. at 3165
(citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (providing for the admission of prior
testimony based on a test of reliability and necessity)). See also Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (barring the use of evidence rules regarding hearsay to
prevent a defendant from using third party admissions against penal interest in his
defense if the defendant would be denied a fair trial); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S.
387 (1986) (providing for a co-conspirator's admission against interest to be admitted
against a defendant).
136. Craig, 110 St. Ct. at 3165 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1895)).





934 University of Puget Sound Law Review
well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important
to outweigh ... a defendant's right to face his or her accusers
in court.' 141 The Court noted that a majority of states have
enacted similar statutes, indicating the widespread belief in the
importance of such a public policy.1 The Court further noted
that the state interest is "buttressed by the growing body of
academic literature documenting the psychological trauma suf-
fered by child abuse victims who must testify in court.' 1 43
Thus, the Maryland statute furthered a compelling state
interest.14
In holding the state interest in protecting child witnesses
from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case sufficiently
important to justify the use of one-way closed-circuit testi-
mony, the Court indicated that the state must make a case-spe-
cific showing of necessity. 45 A finding of necessity requires
three inquiries: (1) Is the use of one-way closed-circuit televi-
sion necessary to protect a particular child witness? (2) Would
the child be traumatized by the presence of the defendant, and
not by the courtroom generally? and (3) Is the emotional dis-
tress suffered by the child so significant that the child's ability
to communicate is impaired?146  The majority, however,
declined to establish any procedure for the courts to use in
finding necessity. Rather, the Supreme Court left the states to
determine the evidentiary requirements that must be met to
establish necessity. 4  As long as a trial court makes a case-
specific finding of necessity, the Confrontation Clause is satis-
fied. Thus, the Court held that the Maryland statute satisfied
the Confrontation Clause.
In conclusion, the majority in Craig, although noting the
importance of face-to-face confrontation, held that such con-
frontation is not always constitutionally mandated. Face-to-
141. See id. at 3169.
142. Id. Thirty-seven states permit videotaped testimony of sexually abused
children; twenty-four states permit one-way closed-circuit television testimony in such
cases; and eight states authorize two-way television systems in the same type of cases.
Id. at 3167-68.
143. Id. at 3168 (citing the Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus
Curiae 7-13). See also Gail S. Goodman et al., Emotional Effects of Criminal Court
Testimony on Child Sexual Assault Victims, Final Report to the National Institute of
Justice (presented as conference paper at annual convention of American
Psychological Ass'n, Aug. 1989).
144. Id. at 3167-69.
145. Id. at 3169.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 3171.
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face confrontation is not required if the denial of confrontation
is necessary and carries with it the necessary indicia of reliabil-
ity as defined by Roberts.48 Protecting the child witness from
the trauma of testifying in the presence of the defendant quali-
fies as necessity if that trauma impairs the child's ability to
communicate. Where this necessity is coupled with standards
for indicia of reliability, face-to-face confrontation may be
denied by the use of one-way closed-circuit testimony.
IV. WASHINGTON'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
A. Washington's Interpretation of the Face-to-Face
Requirement
Article I, section 22, of the Washington State Constitution
requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right . . . to meet witnesses against him face-to-
face.... "149 The United States Constitution's language is not
as explicit as Washington's "face to face" language.15° Never-
theless, the Washington Supreme Court has adopted the rea-
soning of the United States Supreme Court in analyzing
confrontation issues.151 The Washington Supreme Court thus
addresses Confrontation Clause issues by relying on federal
precedent rather than by adopting its own analysis specific to
the State's Confrontation Clause. 5 2 Therefore, Confrontation
Clause issues in Washington State are governed by the federal
standard.15
3
148. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
149. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22.
150. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution only requires that
"the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
151. See, e.g., State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984) (court sets out
the text of the Confrontation Clause for both the U.S. and Washington Constitutions
but does not address the differences in the language).
152. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1986) (applying
the Confrontation Clause analysis and application of the Roberts unavailability test to
determine whether the admission of declaration against penal interest was proper);
State v. Hieb, 107 Wash. 2d 97, 727 P.2d 239 (1986) (applying unavailability test to
excited utterance); State v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 508 (1982) (applying
unavailability test to declaration against penal interest).
153. See, e.g., State v. Hieb, 107 Wash. 2d 97, 727 P.2d 239 (1986); State v.
Terrovona, 105 Wash. 2d 632, 716 P.2d 295 (1986); State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691
P.2d 197 (1984); State v. Dictado, 102 Wash. 2d 277, 687 P.2d 172 (1984); State v.
Valladares, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983); State v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654
P.2d 508 (1982); State v. Griffith, 45 Wash. App. 728, 727 P.2d 247 (1986); State v.
Edmondson, 43 Wash. App. 443, 717 P.2d 784 (1986); State v. Ross, 42 Wash. App. 806,
714 P.2d 703 (1986); State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 688 P.2d 538 (1984); State v.
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Although Washington cases have stated that the right to
confrontation is not absolute in other contexts, the Washington
Constitution could be construed as granting greater protection
to defendants on the issue of closed-circuit testimony.'- 4 The
Washington Supreme Court has held that Washington courts
have the power to interpret independently the state constitu-
tional provisions as more protective of individual rights than
the parallel provisions of the United States Constitution.1
5 5
Note, however, that the argument for independent interpreta-
tion must be made by counsel before the court will take up the
issue.156
Bockman, 37 Wash. App. 474, 682 P.2d 925 (1984); State v. Murphy, 35 Wash. App. 658,
669 P.2d 891 (1983); State v. York, 28 Wash. App. 33, 621 P.2d 784 (1980); State v.
Roberts, 25 Wash. App. 830, 611 P.2d 1297 (1980); State v. Whittington, 27 Wash. App.
422, 618 P.2d 121 (1980); State v. Pickens, 27 Wash. App. 97, 615 P.2d 537 (1980); State v.
Wilder, 25 Wash. App. 568, 608 P.2d 270 (1980); State v. Carter, 23 Wash. App. 297, 596
P.2d 1354 (1979); State v. Firven, 22 Wash. App. 703, 591 P.2d 869 (1979).
154. See State v. Valladares, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983), in which the
majority only addressed the federal right to confrontation. The concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Williams stated:
[Tihe "face-to-face" language of Const. art. 1, § 22 seems to require actual
physical confrontation between the accused and any adverse witnesses. And
while the impracticality of actual physical confrontation is not disputed, it also
cannot be disputed that this language at least provides greater protection than
is afforded under both hearsay rules and the Sixth Amendment. Though I by
no means believe that the right of confrontation is absolute, I do believe that
under the Washington Constitution, this right must be more jealously guarded
than similar rights under the Sixth Amendment. To this end, any
examination of the extent of this protection must include a careful balancing
of the competing interests of the State and the accused with added weight
being placed upon the accused's side of the scale.
Id. at 674, 664 P.2d at 514-15.
155. See, e.g., State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984) (interpreting
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)
(interpreting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7). In State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d
808 (1986), the Washington Supreme Court enunciated several factors to be considered
when determining if a different interpretation of the state constitution is required.
The court stated:
The following nonexclusive neutral criteria are relevant in determining
whether, in a given situation, the Washington State Constitution should be
considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than the United States
Constitution: (1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3)
constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and
(6) matters of particular state or local concern.
Id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 811. These factors are not determinative but merely "relevant" to
the decision regarding independent interpretation. Id. at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
156. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 112 Wash. 2d 488, 498 n.11, 772 P.2d 496, 501 n.11
(1989) (declining to examine the issue of independent state constitutional analysis
because defense counsel did not argue for an independent analysis of the state and
federal Confrontation Clauses).
Because the Washington Supreme Court has never been asked to independently
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Nevertheless, it is useful to examine how other states have
interpreted their Confrontation Clauses, in order to determine
how Washington may interpret its Confrontation Clause relat-
ing to closed-circuit testimony of children in child abuse cases.
B. Interpretation of the Face-to-Face Requirement in Other
Jurisdictions
Some states, analyzing the same constitutional language as
that present in Washington's constitution, have interpreted the
right guaranteed by the state constitution as identical to the
right of confrontation guaranteed by the federal constitution.
For example, the Confrontation Clauses contained in the state
constitutions of both Kentucky and Pennsylvania contain
wording identical to that of Washington's constitution.157 Yet
the courts in those states have refused to construe the express
language as strictly as might be suggested, holding that the
face-to-face requirement does not provide any greater protec-
tion for the defendant than that guaranteed by the federal
Constitution."s Thus, the stricter language in the Kentucky
and Pennsylvania constitutions merely provides the same pro-
tection as the United States Constitution. Each state's inter-
pretation of its respective Confrontation Clause will be
examined in turn.
interpret the Washington Confrontation Clause, the Washington State Legislature
proposed an amendment to the Washington State Constitution, article I, section 22
during both the 1991 and 1992 legislative sessions. The amendment provides that in
criminal prosecutions involving sexual contact with a child ten years of age or younger,
the court may order the testimony of the victim to be taken outside the courtroom and
televised live into the courtroom. S.J. Res. 8217, 52d Leg. (1991). Proponents of the
amendment expressed concern about the constitutional validity of E.S.H.B. 2809
stating that families (as well as prosecutors) do not want their case to be the test case.
Indeed, prosecutors apparently are not using the procedure.
Opponents argued that anticipating constitutional invalidation of the statute was
unwise and premature. They reasoned that the constitutional rights of an accused
person should not be contingent on the crime alleged. Noting that the topic of sexual
abuse is highly charged and emotional, the opponents contended that the legislature
should place a limit on intervention and allow the courts do to their job without
unnecessarily changing the constitution. The opponents prevailed during both sessions
when the resolution died in the House Rules Committee.
157. The Kentucky and Pennsylvania Constitutions guarantee a person accused in
a criminal prosecution the right "to meet witnesses face to face." The specific
language of both constitutions is as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
has the right.., to meet the witness face to face .... " KY. CONST. § 11; PA. CONST.
art. I, § 9.
158. See Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Ky. 1986); Commonwealth
v. Ludwig, 531 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
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In Commonwealth v. Willis,159 the prosecution requested
that the testimony of a five-year-old sexual abuse victim be
taken pursuant to a Kentucky statute that permits the use of
one-way closed-circuit televised testimony in sex abuse cases of
children under the age of twelve.'60 The trial court sustained
the defense motion to exclude the testimony of the child wit-
ness, holding the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the
defendant's right to confrontation.' 6 ' The Kentucky Supreme
Court reversed, thereby upholding the constitutionality of the
Kentucky statute.
Kentucky's highest court observed that the Confrontation
Clause contained in the Kentucky Constitution guaranteed to a
defendant the right to meet witnesses "face to face.' 62 Never-
theless, the court stated that "[t]here is no authority to support
the proposition that the right of confrontation guaranteed by
the Kentucky Constitution should be construed more strin-
gently than the same right in the United States Constitu-
tion." ' 6 3 Thus, even though the Kentucky State Constitution
specifically states that the accused has the right "to meet the
witnesses face to face," the court held that a statute allowing
the closed-circuit televised testimony of a child victim satisfies
that constitutional requirement. In so holding, the court rea-
soned that the closed-circuit testimony statute was constitu-
tional because it (1) did not unduly inhibit the defendant's
right of cross-examination; (2) applied to a narrow class of wit-
nesses (children twelve years old or younger who were victims
of sex offenses); and (3) was in the interest of the truth deter-
mining process.164
The Kentucky Supreme Court further recognized that
there is no constitutional right to "eyeball to eyeball" confron-
tation 6 5 and that the choice of the words face-to-face were a
possible result of an inability to foresee technological advances,
which today permit cross-examination without actual physical
confrontation.'6 The use of such technology, according to the
court, should be implemented to enhance truth-determination
159. 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
160. Id. at 226.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 227.
163. Id. at 229.
164. Id. at 227-28.




at trials.6 7 Thus, the Kentucky Confrontation Clause, identi-
cal to the Washington Confrontation Clause, did not afford the
defendant protection from the use of closed-circuit testimony.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the
right of confrontation guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution did not exceed the right of confrontation guaranteed by
the federal constitution. In Commonwealth v. Ludwig,1 68 the
defendant was charged with sexually molesting his six-year-old
daughter.'69 At trial, the child was permitted to testify via one-
way closed-circuit television.170 On appeal, Ludwig contended
that the right to confront his accuser, as guaranteed by the
United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, was violated by
the use of this procedure.' 7 ' The Pennsylvania Superior Court
approved the trial court's use of closed-circuit testimony on the
basis that "there is no constitutional right to eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation."172
In reaching its decision, the superior court emphasized the
difference between confrontation and intimidation: the right
to confront does not confer upon an accused the right to intim-
idate.' Further, the reliability of an abused child's testimony
does not depend upon her ability to withstand the psychologi-
cal trauma of testifying in a courtroom under the unwavering
gaze of a parent who, although a possible abuser, has also been
provider, protector, and parent.174 Rather, the reliability of the
child's testimony can be assured by requiring the child to sub-
mit to cross-examination while the jury and the accused
observe the demeanor of the witness as he or she responds to
questions. In the case under consideration, such observation
was accomplished by closed-circuit television. 175 Hence, the
Pennsylvania court found that the closed-circuit testimony pro-
cedure did not violate the defendants' right to confront wit-
nesses against him but rather served to enhance the fact-
167. See id. at 230-31.
168. 531 A.2d 459 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
169. Id. at 459.
170. Id. The trial court, within its discretion, permitted use of closed-circuit
television. Id. Following the trial, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted 42 PA. CONsT.
STAT. § 5985(a) allowing for the use of closed-circuit testimony by child abuse victims
for good cause shown. Id. at 463, n.7.
171. Id. at 460.
172. Id. at 462 (quoting Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 463.
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finding process. 1 7 1
Courts in other jurisdictions also reject a restrictive view
of the right to confrontation. In State v. Sheppard,177 the New
Jersey Superior Court reiterated that the Confrontation
Clause is subject to exceptions when the court granted the
state's motion to allow the closed-circuit testimony of a child
sexual abuse victim. 178 In reaching its conclusion to allow the
child to testify by closed-circuit television, the New Jersey
court stated:
[k]nown abusers are not being prosecuted because evidence
against them cannot be presented. Children who are pre-
vailed upon to testify may be more damaged by their trau-
matic role in the court proceedings than they were by their
abuse. These considerations must be weighed and balanced
against the right of confrontation in child abuse cases.
179
Furthermore, the court stated that only a "modest ero-
sion" of the clause, if any, would take place in this case because
the defendant was able to view the witness during her testi-
mony and to participate in the cross-examination of the wit-
ness.180  The court also emphasized that the modified
arrangement would enhance, not diminish, the prospect of the
child testifying truthfully.'8" Thus, the New Jersey court
found that because the "ultimate quest" in all judicial proceed-
ings is truth, the closed-circuit procedure was constitutional.
182
Judicial interpretation of the protection afforded defend-
ants on the issue of closed-circuit testimony under Washing-
ton's Confrontation Clause is questionable. Although the
Washington Supreme Court could interpret the clause to pro-
vide greater protection to defendants, such a result is unlikely
because of the court's current method of relying on federal
precedent, which permits child witnesses to testify via closed-
circuit testimony so long as there is a case-specific finding of
176. Id. at 464.
177. 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
178. The New Jersey Superior Court interpreted the Confrontation Clauses of the
U.S. CONST. amend. VI and of the N.J. CONST. art. I, § 10, both of which guarantee that
the accused has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Id.
179. Id. at 1342.
180. Id. at 1343. Because the defendant, as well as the judge, jury and spectators,
could clearly see and hear the witness, adequate opportunities for cross-examination
were provided.




necessity. Furthermore, other states with identical Confronta-
tion Clause language have not interpreted their Confrontation
Clauses to provide greater protection to defendants.
V. ANALYSIS OF E.S.H.B. 2809
With the preceding principles of interpreting the Confron-
tation Clause in mind, we turn to an analysis of Washington's
closed-circuit testimony provision, E.S.H.B. 2809. E.S.H.B. 2809
satisfies the essential elements of confrontation and also satis-
fies the requirements of necessity and reliability set out in
Maryland v. Craig. Furthermore, other issues raised by the
use of the E.S.H.B. 2809 procedure are not impediments to the
statute's constitutional validity.
A. Requirements for the Use of Closed-Circuit Testimony as
Stated in Maryland v. Craig
In Maryland v. Craig,183 the Supreme Court articulated
three findings of necessity that the trial court must make in
order to take a child's testimony via one-way closed-circuit tel-
evision. First, the Court held that the requisite finding of
necessity must be determined on a case-specific basis.184 Sec-
ond, the trial court must find that the child witness would be
traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the pres-
ence of the defendant.185 And third, the trial court must find
that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness is
more than "mere nervousness or excitement or some reluc-
tance to testify.'
1186
E.S.H.B. 2809 can be analyzed under each of the Craig
requirements. First, the statute explicitly restricts the use of
closed-circuit testimony to cases in which the necessity has
been particularly demonstrated. 87 Furthermore, the statute
applies only to a narrow class of witnesses: children under the
age of ten who are victims of abuse. 88 In order to utilize
closed-circuit testimony, the trial court must also find that no
less restrictive method of obtaining the testimony can ade-
quately protect the child.'8 9 Thus, the statute satisfies the first
183. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
184. Id. at 3169.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)).
187. E.S.H.B. 2809, supra note 1, at § 2.
188. Id. at § 2(1)(a).
189. Id. at § 2(1)(g).
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requirement for a finding of necessity under Craig.
Second, E.S.H.B. 2809 allows a child to testify outside the
presence of the jury when the trial court finds that requiring
the child to testify in front of the jury will cause the child to
suffer serious emotional distress."9 In Craig, the Court stated
that the trauma suffered by the child must be caused by the
presence of the defendant in order to deny face-to-face con-
frontation. Thus, E.S.H.B. 2809 appears inconsistent with
Craig.
Upon closer examination, however, the Washington stat-
ute is not inconsistent. The rationale for the trauma require-
ment is that denial of face-to-face confrontation is unnecessary
if the child could testify in less intimidating surroundings with
the defendant present.'9 ' The Washington State Legislature
avoided conflict with this requirement by providing that,
where the child is allowed to testify outside the presence of the
jury, the child will nevertheless testify in the presence of the
defendant. 92 By adding a provision allowing for testimony
outside the presence of the jury but in the presence of the
defendant, the legislature recognized that a child may also suf-
fer emotional distress from testifying in front of the jury to
such an extent that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
Such a procedure does not place the defendant's right of con-
frontation at issue because the defendant is present even
though the jury is not. Thus, E.S.H.B. 2809 satisfies the second
finding of necessity established in Craig.
Third, E.S.H.B. 2809 requires a determination that the
child will suffer "serious emotional or mental distress that will
prevent the child from reasonably communicating." '93 This
requirement is consistent with the third requirement of Craig.
Indeed, where face-to-face confrontation causes significant
emotional distress for the child, the possibility of effective tes-
timony may be prevented, thereby undermining the truth-
seeking goal of the Confrontation Clause.'9 Moreover, some
researchers in the mental health community believe that the
assumption that cross-examination is the best way to arrive at
the truth is an incorrect assumption when applied to chil-
190. Id. at § 2(1)(d).
191. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3189 (1990).
192. E.S.H.B. 2809, supra note 1, at § 2(1)(d).
193. Id. at § 2(1)(c).
194. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. at 1032 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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dren.195 Several commentators argue that the use of closed-cir-
cuit testimony may actually enhance the reliability of victims'
testimony.196 The utilization of closed-circuit television may
actually enable the jury to better assess the child's testimony.
Thus, E.S.H.B. 2809 satisfies the third requirement of Craig.
In sum, E.S.H.B. 2809 fulfills all of the requirements set
forth in Maryland v. Craig.
B. E.S.H.B. 2809 Satisfies the Elements of the Right to
Confrontation
In addition to satisfying the necessity requirement of
Craig, Washington's E.S.H.B. 2809 also satisfies the elements of
the confrontation right and thereby meets the standards for
indicia of reliability. According to the Supreme Court, the
essential elements of confrontation include oath, cross-exami-
nation, and observation of the witness's demeanor.
197
First, E.S.H.B. 2809 requires that the child witness, whose
testimony is taken by use of one-way closed-circuit television,
testify under oath.9 . during the criminal proceeding. Second,
E.S.H.B. 2809 does not unduly inhibit the right of cross-exami-
195. Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual AssaulL Children's
Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 201 (1985). The authors write:
High levels of stress can be expected to interfere with a person's ability to
retrieve information and to make accurate eye witness identifications. The
child may have greater difficulty understanding the questions asked.
Psychological research indicates that high levels of stress reduce short-term
memory capacity, a capacity needed to comprehend sentences. Testifying in a
courtroom is likely to be stressful for any witness, but there are several
reasons to predict greater stress for children .... When placed in a novel,
stressful situation, children may also be more susceptible to suggestion.
Because stress interferes with the retrieval process, and because retrieval
failures in turn predict heightened suggestibility, it is possible that courtroom
questioning will make children more susceptible to suggestion. The court's
liberal allowance of leading questions can be expected to aggravate this
problem .... In sum, many factors point to the conclusion that, if the goal is
to determine the truth, the adversary process may not be the best means of
obtaining the truth from children.
Id. at 203-04 (footnotes omitted).
196. See Ira C. Colby & Deborah N. Colby, Videotaped Interviews in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases: The Texas Example, in 66 CHILD WELFARE 25, 28 (1987) (noting that
videotape interviews provide a more accurate account of the child's report than a
written statement); Sol Gothard, The Admissibility of Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 66 CHILD WELFARE 13, 17 (1987) (explaining that child victims often produce
contradictory and unreliable evidence; some courts are setting a precedent by
modifying courtroom procedures to accommodate such contradictions, memory lapses,
or discrepancies).
197. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166 (1990).
198. E.S.H.B. 2809, supra note 1, at § 2(1)(b).
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nation. The defendant still has the right to hear and observe
the witness testify. Moreover, the defendant is not precluded
from presenting evidence to attack the credibility of the wit-
ness. To further satisfy the Confrontation Clause right to an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, E.S.H.B. 2809
allows the defendant to be in constant communication with his
or her attorney during the child's testimony."9 Thus, the
defendant's opportunity for cross-examination is not impaired.
Third, the jury's ability to assess the demeanor of the wit-
ness appearing before it will not be sacrificed by Washington's
closed-circuit testimony statute even though the jury must
assess demeanor based solely on what it is able to see on a tele-
vision screen. Indeed, in Craig, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of demeanor. The Court noted that use of the closed-
circuit testimony procedure permitted the judge, jury, and
defendant to view the demeanor of the witness while he or she
testified, even though by video monitor.2° Furthermore, the
highest courts of at least two states have held that videotaped
testimony is a constitutionally adequate substitute for the pur-
pose of assessing demeanor by the trier of fact.
20 1
In fact, the jury's ability to assess demeanor is enhanced
by the Washington statute because the statute addresses sound
and picture quality as well as the viewing conditions under
which the defendant and jury will observe the testimony of the
child. The statute specifically entrusts the judge with the
responsibility of assuring that the sound and picture are of
199. Id. § 2(1)(h). Not only is the defendant able to communicate constantly with
the defense attorney by electronic transmission, but also the defendant is granted
reasonable court recesses during the child's testimony for person-to-person
consultation with the defense attorney.
200. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166.
201. State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). The court
gave formal authorization to the use of videotaped depositions as evidence in criminal
trials stating that "it is apparent to this court from the demonstration of the
equipment to be used in this matter and the expert testimony that the use of a
videotaped presentation has the capacity to present clear, accurate, and evidentially
appropriate transmissions of images and sounds to defendant, the judge, the jury, and
the public." Id. at 1342. Accord Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
The court stated:
Confrontation does not require live presentation of evidence to the trier of
fact. A photographic or electronic presentation is not perfect as a substitute
for live testimony but it will suffice. Video tape cannot be any less helpful in
enabling a jury to assess credibility than a bare transcript read by the
prosecutor.
Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 230 (citing United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 846 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 996 (1977)).
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such quality that the child's facial expression and voice are
clear enough to be useful in evaluating the truth of the testi-
mony.202 Furthermore, E.S.H.B. 2809, section 2(1)(j), requires
that where possible, all parties in the room with the child must
be on camera. If viewing all participants is not possible, this
section requires the court to describe for the viewers the loca-
tion of the prosecutor, defense attorney, and other participants
in relation to the child. Thus, the trier of fact is not impaired,
and may even be aided, in observing the child witness's
demeanor.
E.S.H.B. 2809 thus bears significant indicia of reliability
and satisfies the elements of the right to confrontation. First,
the closed-circuit procedure is utilized when the child witness
is under oath. Second, the enactment does not abridge the
defendant's opportunity for cross-examination because the
defendant can hear and observe the witness testify, and the
defendant remains in constant communication with counsel.
Finally, the E.S.H.B. 2809 procedure provisions make the child
witness's demeanor readily observable.
C. Other Issues That May Raise Confrontation Clause
Challenges
The use of one-way closed-circuit testimony may raise
other challenges under the Confrontation Clause. For exam-
ple, the use of one-way closed-circuit testimony itself, being a
deviation from ordinary courtroom procedure, may have an
inherently prejudicial impact upon the jury.203 A convicted
defendant may claim that merely using the procedure compro-
mised the defendant's right to the presumption of innocence. 0 4
Defendants' claims that undue prejudice results from the
employment of extraordinary procedures are not uncommon
and are often upheld on appeal.20 5 However, appellate courts
202. E.S.H.B. 2809, supra note 1, at § 2(1)(k).
203. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965) (stating that "at times a
procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result
that it is deemed inherently lacking due process.").
204. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). "Courts have, with few
exceptions, determined that an accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison
or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption [of innocence]
so basic to the adversary system." Id. at 504 (footnote omitted).
205. See, e.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (reversing murder
conviction on due process grounds where deputy sheriffs, who gave key prosecution
testimony at defendant's murder trial, also had charge of jury during three-day trial);
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (holding that defendant's due process rights were
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assess such claims not in absolute terms but by scrutinizing the
necessity for extraordinary measures in the particular case.2°
Because E.S.H.B. 2809 includes provisions requiring that the
trial court make particularized findings in order to take a
child's testimony via one-way closed-circuit television, a court
is unlikely to find a violation of a defendant's confrontation
rights.
Another potential issue of closed-circuit testimony
involves the unavailability and reliability criteria required by
Roberts and alluded to in Coy. In determining whether admis-
sion of a hearsay statement violated the Confrontation Clause,
the Court in Roberts stated that hearsay statements are admis-
sible only if the state can show the declarant is "unavailable"
and if the hearsay evidence bears adequate "indicia of
reliability."207
E.S.H.B. 2809 satisfies the unavailability criterion by
requiring that the trial court make a specific finding that the
child could not reasonably communicate. Specifically, the
court must find that the child's testimony in the courtroom in
the presence of the defendant or the jury would cause such
serious emotional distress that the child could not reasonably
communicate. If the child cannot reasonably testify because
she is too frightened or inarticulate to allow any meaningful
examination, then a finding of unavailability would be
justified.
E.S.H.B. 2809 also satisfies the second Roberts element of
reliability because the child witness is: (1) under oath; (2) open
to full cross-examination by defense counsel present with the
child; and (3) before a judicial proceeding that is equipped to
provide records of the proceeding.08 In addition, the judge or
violated where same judge who tried contempt charge also had presided over grand
jury hearing where defendant was adjudged in contempt). But see Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337 (1970) (holding that Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were not violated
where defendant was removed from trial because his disruptive conduct interfered
with courtroom decorum); State v. Williams, 501 P.2d 328 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) (holding
that defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated where defendant's
chanting disrupted proceedings, requiring his removal from courtroom to jury room,
where he was able to watch trial on closed-circuit television).
206. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (stating that "something more
than the type of generalized finding underlying such a statute is needed when the
exception is not 'firmly . . . rooted in our jurisprudence.' ") (quoting Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (citation omitted)). See also Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607, n.19 (1982).
207. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
208. Id. at 69 (1980).
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jury may observe the demeanor of the child witness during tes-
timony to determine "whether he is worthy of belief."2 °9 The
defendant may also observe the testimony and communicate
with his or her attorney by an audio system. Thus, E.S.H.B.
2809 fulfills the requirements of unavailability and reliability.
The only component of the right to confrontation absent
from the list of elements encompassed by E.S.H.B. 2809 is that
of the child witness seeing the defendant. Precedent from the
Supreme Court, however, indicates that this component is
expendable if a compelling state interest exists. 10 E.S.H.B.
2809 fulfills a compelling state interest by successfully discov-
ering and prosecuting child abuse. Therefore, none of the
potential issues raised by the use of a closed-circuit testimony
procedure is likely to present serious challenges to the consti-
tutional validity of E.S.H.B. 2809.
VI. DOES E.S.H.B. 2809 FALL SHORT OF ITS PURPOSE?
Although the constitutional validity of E.S.H.B. 2809 is
well founded, a few areas exist in which E.S.H.B. 2809 may fall
short of its underlying purpose211 and may require revision.21 2
First, the statute should prohibit either party from later calling
the child to testify in court unless the court rules that the
interests of justice require further direct or cross-examination.
Otherwise, the statute's purpose would be defeated by permit-
ting the child to be later subjected to the trauma that the court
has already found unacceptable. 1 This allows children to
know that the court is finished with them so that they can put
the traumatic experience behind them.214 However, the high
rate of retraction by child sexual abuse victims cannot be
ignored. The goal of E.S.H.B. 2809 is to obtain reliable testi-
mony as well as to protect children from emotional trauma.
To preserve an objective record, many commentators suggest
209. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
210. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021; Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3169 (1990).
211. E.S.H.B. 2809, § 1 declares that the purpose of the statute is the protection of
child witnesses in sexual and physical abuse cases as well as the facilitation of
prosecution in such cases.
212. Legislators in Washington have twice pushed for constitutional amendment
because prosecutors are not using the procedure provided for in E.S.H.B. 2809.
However, the constitution may not be the barrier, but rather the statute itself may be
too stringent.
213. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 827 (1985).
214. Id. at 825-26.
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videotaping pretrial child witness interviews. 215
Second, the age qualification of the child witness in the
Washington provision is restrictively low because it leaves too
many children between the ages of eleven and seventeen
unprotected. The provision requires that the child be ten years
old or younger to utilize the closed-circuit testimony proce-
dure. 6 Other states using similar procedures require that the
child be seventeen years old or younger.217 There is no reason
to assume that children between the ages of eleven and seven-
teen would be less subject to psychological harm than children
eleven and under. The minor's age should be irrelevant, as
long as the victim is a minor as described by state law and the
child will suffer serious emotional or mental distress. Hence,
the age limit for utilization of closed-circuit testimony should
be expanded.
Third, E.S.H.B. 2809 does not have adequate safeguards to
help circumvent claims of inherent prejudice and abuse of dis-
cretion. E.S.H.B. 2809 states that one-way closed-circuit testi-
mony will be allowed only if the court finds that requiring the
child to testify in the presence of the defendant or the jury
"will cause the child to suffer serious emotional or mental dis-
tress that will prevent the child from reasonably communicat-
ing at the trial. 21 8 However, the provision merely requires
that the court determine the necessity for the procedure by
"substantial evidence."
The statute should be more explicit. One suggestion is the
use of expert testimony. An adequate showing of the
probability of emotional or mental trauma can be made at the
pretrial hearing by using expert psychological evaluation and
testimony.21 9 The use of expert testimony would have a dual
effect. First, it would remove some of the pressure that anx-
ious parents or relatives may exert on the trial judge when
215. See, e.g., John R. Christiansen, Washington Survey.: The Testimony of Child
Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy and the Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV.
705, 714 (1987): Kee MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MiAMI L. REV. 135, 141 (1985).
216. E.S.H.B. 2809, supra note 1, at § 2(1).
217. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (1988); FLA. STAT. ch. 92.54 (1989); HAw. R.
EVID. 616; MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-701(d) (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-32.4 (West 1989); and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (1988).
218. E.S.H.B. 2809, supra note 1, at § 2(1)(c).
219. See, Dirk Lorenzen, Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Psychological




they encourage the judge to act unilaterally to spare their child
the ordeal of testifying in open court. Second, the expert testi-
mony requirement would allow appellate courts to assess more
adequately defendants' claims that the trial court abused its
discretion in utilizing the closed-circuit procedure. Employ-
ment of the procedure would thus not be based solely upon a
judge's determination of the child's condition; the procedure
would become a discretionary decision founded on an expert's
assessment that a substantial likelihood of trauma exists. An
expert testimony standard would exceed a "generalized pre-
sumption of harm" and establish the "case-specific finding of
necessity... [under which] the strictures of the Confrontation
Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of pro-
tecting child witnesses."20 Thus, E.S.H.B. 2809 could provide
for expert witnesses to substantiate a claim that a child witness
would suffer emotional harm from testifying in the presence of
the defendant.221
E.S.H.B. 2809 also raises the question of which factors the
courts should use in evaluating a witness's ability to testify. In
propounding that procedural modifications are a "minimal
intrusion" of a defendant's right of confrontation, the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) suggests various factors for trial
judges to consider.222 These include the age of the child, the
nature of the offense, the relationship of the child to the
defendant, and possible threats to the child.223 The ABA
asserts that in protecting the child's interest, the methods of
assessing each child's case should not themselves subject the
child to further psychological harm.224 Such factors should be
incorporated into E.S.H.B. 2809 in order to standardize the trial
court's considerations.
Finally, closed-circuit testimony is not the only alternative
procedure available to child witnesses. In fact, in some circum-
stances it may not be the best alternative. A provision permit-
220. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1025 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
221. However, in providing for expert witnesses, there is a strong need to avoid a
battle of experts, which ultimately may increase the odds of trauma to a child.
222. Brief for the American Bar Association at 6-7, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012
(1988) (No.86-6757).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 7. According to the ABA, "the child victim should neither be subjected
to lengthy voir dire or psychological evaluations, nor should the proceedings be
delayed after the child has been called to testify. The judge may rely upon
information from lay persons which provide[s] credible evidence that a child may
suffer harm if required to testify with a full view of the defendant." Id.
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ting the use of videotaped testimony would provide additional
protection for child victims of sexual abuse. At least thirty-
eight states have enacted videotaping statutes.225 Most statutes
treat videotaped testimony as the functional equivalent of testi-
mony at trial.22
6
Once the child's testimony and cross-examination has been
recorded, the child victim is not expected to testify at trial.227
These statutes do not call for a court determination that the
child be designated as unavailable. 22 The statutes simply ask
the court to find that the child will suffer some emotional
trauma if required to testify in open court or in front of the
accused.229
Although these statutes do not require the usual unavaila-
bility finding, they have other safeguards. Indeed, statutes that
permit videotaped testimony provide full opportunity for cross-
examination and alert the defendant that the videotaped testi-
mony may be offered in lieu of the child's testimony at trial.
Furthermore, the videotaping statutes preserve the essential
elements of confrontation: the oath, the opportunity to
225. See supra note 31.
226. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17(A) (Michie Supp. 1989), which provides in
pertinent part that:
In any prosecution for criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact
of a minor, upon motion of the district attorney and after notice to the
opposing counsel, the district court may, for a good cause shown, order the
taking of a videotaped deposition of any alleged victim under the age of
sixteen years .... Examination and cross-examination of the alleged victim
shall proceed . . . in the same manner as permitted at trial . . . . Any
videotaped deposition taken under the provisions of this act . . . shall be
viewed and heard at the trial and entered into the record in lieu of the direct
testimony of the alleged victim.
227. The following states have statutes that include similar provisions: Alabama,
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See Bainor, supra note 18.
228. Only the statutes in California, Colorado, Indiana, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota require a specific finding of unavailability. For instance, the California statute
requires a finding that "further testimony would cause the victim emotional trauma so
that the victim is medically unavailable .... " CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346(d) (West 1982
& Supp. 1989)..
229. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1987) (requiring a
finding that the mental or physical well-being of that person will more likely than not
be harmed if that person were to testify in open court); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278,
§ 16D (West Supp. 1989) (requiring a finding that the child witness is likely to suffer
psychological or emotional harm); and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988)
(requiring a finding that testifying would be substantially detrimental to the well-
being of the victim).
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observe the witness's demeanor, and the right to cross-
examine."3
Videotaped testimony is an effective alternative to requir-
ing the child to testify in person. Videotaped testimony
resolves the problems of live testimony by enabling the child's
story to be heard in the courtroom while at the same time
making the child's experience less traumatic. The greatest
advantages of videotaping include protecting the child from
endless repetition of testimony, allowing the child to withdraw
from the court system at an early stage in the proceedings, and
securing the child's testimony against forgetfulness and retrac-
tion.2 3' Videotaping also provides a permanent record of
exactly what transpired in the interview, both verbally and
nonverbally. Moreover, seeing and hearing the original version
of the child's disclosure may transmit a sense of validity to the
jury that later repeated questioning may not.
In addition to minimizing the number of times the victim
must testify, the videotape better reflects the content of the
testimony and the demeanor of the child witness.232 For exam-
ple, "[t]he tape can detect whether the child's reaction was
hurried or deliberate, angry or satisfied, calm or excited.
Spontaneous statements can easily be distinguished from
responses to leading questions and hesitant voices can be iden-
tified and compared to confident ones.
' 233
Although many advantages to videotaping the testimony of
a child witness exist, videotaping undeniably alters the nature
of confrontation and renders it a marginally less effective
defensive tool. Videotapes may not faithfully convey the wit-
ness's demeanor and may impede the jury's determination of
credibility.21 Technical criticisms of videotaped testimony
undoubtedly have some merit. But these criticisms are not so
weighty as to curtail further development of videotaped testi-
mony. Indeed, similar objections were raised when videotaped
depositions were introduced in civil litigation; however, experi-
230. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 69 (1980).
231. The reliability of initial interview statements made by the child under
nonthreatening circumstances may be used to refute later retractions often resulting
from the succession of negatively associated events that frequently follow disclosure.
See MacFarlane, supra note 216, at 145.
232. Libai, supra note 10, at 992.
233. Id at 990.
234. See Charles W. German, et al., Videotape Evidence at Trial, 6 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 209, 210 (1982).
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ence with the process, evolution of standards, and technical
refinement led to general acceptance of the technology.235 The
same outcome may be predicted for video testimony.
Standards similar to the technical standards required in
E.S.H.B. 2809 could reduce many of the problems of conveying
witness demeanor. With such standards in place, the reasons
for enacting a videotape statute in child abuse cases far out-
weigh the reasons for not enacting such a statute.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider the ques-
tion of whether the use of videotaped testimony in a criminal
prosecution violates the defendant's rights to confrontation,
the question has been addressed in numerous lower court deci-
sions."' These decisions almost unanimously approve the use
of videotaped depositions of unavailable witnesses at trial. The
approving courts analogize videotaped depositions to prelimi-
nary hearings or pretrial testimony, which are considered con-
stitutionally admissible at trial if the witness is truly
unavailable to appear in person. In fact, the courts consider a
videotape of an unavailable witness's testimony preferable to
reading a manuscript of the same testimony to the jury.2 37 As
long as the defendant has an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the pretrial stage, a statute declaring
the child witness unavailable would probably survive constitu-
tional challenge.
Although videotaped testimony has a good chance of with-
standing constitutional attack, such testimony may not be
widely used. A child's testimony on video tape is rarely as con-
vincing as the real thing. Prosecutors usually prefer live testi-
mony to prerecorded testimony unless they are convinced that
the child will suffer harm or the case will collapse without the
substitution of prerecorded testimony.238  Videotaped testi-
235. See 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2115 (Supp. 1985).
236. See, e.g., United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1985); In re R.C. Jr.,
514 So. 2d 759 (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Cooper, 353 S.E.2d 451 (S.C. 1987); State v.
Johnson, 729 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1986); Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985);
State v. Melendez, 661 P.2d 654 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
237. Deborah Clark-Weintraub, Note, The Use of Videotaped Testimony of
Victims in Cases Involving Child Sexual Abuse: A Constitutional Dilemma, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 261, 263-64 (1986).
238. Gary B. Melton, Procedural Reforms to Protect Child Victims/Witnesses in
Sex Offense Proceedings, in NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD
ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND
THE LAW 184, 189 (J. Buckley ed. 1983).
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mony of child witnesses fits the goals of preventing both harm
and collapsing cases.
The question then becomes which type of videotaped testi-
mony statute might better serve all the interests involved. The
laws of Pennsylvania,239 Nevada,240 Rhode Island,24 ' Ver-
mont,2 42 Minnesota,2 43 Oklahoma,244 Delaware, 245 Florida,2 4 6
and Kansas247 attempt to preserve the defendant's confronta-
tion right yet also consider the damage it can do to a child vic-
tim of sexual abuse and to the child's testimony. These
statutes allow the defendant to see and hear the child and to
communicate with counsel during the testimony although the
defendant is generally not allowed to be within the child's
sight or hearing. This approach allows the defendant the right
to confront physically the witness to some degree while per-
mitting the child to testify outside of the ominous stare of the
accused.
The laws of Massachusetts, 248  Mississippi,249  and Mis-
souri25° permit the defendant to attend the giving of his
accuser's testimony. This right is not absolute, however, and
the judge may restrict attendance if the circumstance
requires. 2 "' The defendant retains the right to cross-examine
during the giving of the testimony.252 The court retains discre-
tion to remove the defendant completely from the proceedings
if the particular circumstances warrant that action.253 Because
239. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5981-88 (1989).
240. NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.227(3) (1986).
241. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-13.1 to -13.2 (Supp. 1988).
242. VT. R. EVID. 807 (Supp. 1986).
243. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988).
244. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1989).
245. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987).
246. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 92.53-54 (West Supp. 1989).
247. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3433 to -34 (1986).
248. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1989) (specifically allowing
defendant to attend proceeding unless deposition ordered to avoid necessity of having
child testify in presence of defendant).
249. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-401 to -15 (Supp. 1989) (requiring that defendant be
allowed to attend unless court finds that his presence will cause child to suffer
traumatic emotional or mental distress).
250. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.675-93 (Vernon Supp. 1989). This statute does not
specifically allow the defendant to attend the proceeding but contains a provision
allowing the judge to exclude him from all proceedings at which the child will testify.
The implication is that the defendant is allowed to attend unless the court exercises
this option.
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each of these videotape deposition statutes, in varying ways
and to varying degrees, permit the judge to balance the consti-
tutional considerations with the facts of the specific case, they
arguably represent the best balance between the rights of the
defendant and the well-being of the victim.
Many existing videotape statutes reserve to the prosecutor
the option of calling the child at trial if the videotaped testi-
mony proves inadequate.2 " This option denies child victims
the potential benefits of videotaping. Videotaping statutes
should therefore provide that once the child has testified on
videotape, neither party may call the child to testify at trial
unless the judge rules that the interests of justice require fur-
ther direct or cross-examination. In such cases, the court
should permit the child to give further testimony on videotape
or by one-way closed-circuit television.
Overall, a provision allowing for videotaped testimony in
child abuse cases would be a welcome addition to closed-circuit
testimony as provided for in E.S.H.B. 2809. Videotaping stat-
utes serve the interests of justice and the needs of child vic-
tims. Furthermore, given the stance of the courts on existing
videotape statutes, the Washington Supreme Court is unlikely
to find that such a statute violates the Confrontation Clause of
either the federal or the state constitutions.
Although E.S.H.B. 2809 is likely to pass constitutional
challenge, it is not perfect. Several questions still remain con-
cerning the statute's ability to truly protect child witnesses, the
underlying purpose of E.S.H.B. 2809. A variety of revisions to
the statute may increase the likelihood of the statute fulfilling
its underlying purpose. First, the statute should be revised to
prohibit either party from later calling the child to testify
unless the trial court rules that the interests of justice require
further direct or cross-examination. Videotaping pretrial inter-
views with children will assure that this provision is fair to
both prosecution and defense. Second, the age limits for the
utilization of closed-circuit testimony should be expanded to
include children up to the age of seventeen. Third, the statute
should explicitly delineate the means by which a showing of
harm is determined. A valuable tool for implementing this
254. The Arkansas and Wisconsin statutes explicitly allow testimony of the child
at trial in addition to presentation of the videotaped deposition. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 43-2036 (Michie Supp. 1987); and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (7)(b) (West 1985 & Supp.
1989). The Montana statute apparently allows both recorded and live testimony. See
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to -402 (1987).
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showing is the use of expert witnesses. Fourth, the statute
should include a list of factors for determining the witness's
ability to testify. Finally, E.S.H.B. 2809 should include the
option of videotaping a child's testimony.
Although the aforementioned revisions to E.S.H.B. 2809
may shore up the statute, several questions still remain con-
cerning the statute's ability to fulfill its underlying purpose of
protecting child witnesses. Despite the importance of these
questions, the answers will be neither immediate nor easily
found.
VII. CONCLUSION
Child abuse victims who testify at trial risk psychological
damage caused by the criminal trial process. As a result,
changes in the legal treatment of child abuse victims is impera-
tive. E.S.H.B. 2809 is a positive step in that direction.
Although the primary purpose of E.S.H.B. 2809 is to protect
victims of child abuse, the primary issue raised by the enact-
ment is whether it violates the defendant's right to
confrontation.
Although the Sixth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution guarantees an accused the right to confront adverse
witnesses, the Supreme Court has pronounced a number of
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that illustrate the
court's willingness to disregard technical adherence to the
Confrontation Clause, particularly where other important
interests exist. The Supreme Court has expressly declared
that protection of children is such an important interest.
In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court confirmed that
face-to-face confrontation is not constitutionally mandated in a
child abuse case when trauma to a child would impair the
child's ability to communicate. Although the Washington
Supreme Court has not independently interpreted the Wash-
ington Confrontation Clause, it is unlikely that Washington's
clause will be held to provide greater protection to defendants.
E.S.H.B. 2809 satisfies the essential elements of confronta-
tion as well as the requirements of necessity and reliability set
out in Maryland v. Craig. Furthermore, none of the potential
issues raised by the use of a closed-circuit testimony procedure
is likely to present serious challenges to the constitutional
validity of E.S.H.B. 2809.
Although E.S.H.B. 2809 falls short of its underlying pur-
1992]
956 University of Puget Sound Law Review
pose in some respects, one-way closed-circuit testimony
adheres closely to the giving of testimony in the traditional
courtroom setting except that the child is not in the defend-
ant's physical presence. Televised one-way closed-circuit testi-
mony is thus the functional equivalent of testimony within the
courtroom. The use of closed-circuit testimony is a slight
infringement on a defendant's right to confrontation; however,
the protection of America's most valued resource, our children,
is a "compelling" interest, making the Confrontation Clause
exception appropriate under certain circumstances. By
enhancing the quality and veracity of child witness's testimony,
E.S.H.B. 2809 can facilitate achieving the ultimate goal of the
judicial system: the acquisition of the truth.
Washington's closed-circuit testimony provision is a small
step toward reducing the trauma that some children may suf-
fer when faced with testifying in the intimidating atmosphere
of the courtroom. The provision is not a radical innovation and
may not have an immediate impact on a large number of prose-
cutions. However, this law is the first in Washington to alter
materially the manner in which courtroom testimony is taken
and, it is hoped, it will not be the last.
The door is now open to additional procedural innovations.
Videotaping statutes also protect children from victimization
within the court system, and the Washington State Legislature
should therefore enact such a statute to operate in tandem
with the closed-circuit testimony statute. However, while new
procedures can and must be implemented, such procedures can
only be valid to the extent that they truly protect the child
witness and do not infringe at the same time upon the defend-
ant's right to confront accusers. Thus, when drafting these
statutes, the legislature must take care to avoid serious impair-
ment of the defendants' right to confrontation.
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